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O'HAGAN, 10b5-2, RELATIONSHIPS
AND DUTIES
Thomas M. Madden, J.D.*

INTRODUCTION

In the past ten years, the law regarding insider trading has been
marked by two principal events: the Supreme Court's O'Hagan' decision
handed down in 1997, and the Commission's modification of Rule lOb-5
effected at the turn of the millennium by SEC Release 33-7881.2 Now,
seven years after the creation of Rules 10b5-1 and 10b5-2, we wonder what
have these rules done to O'Hagan? Specifically, what has Rule 10b5-2
done to the consideration of relationships giving rise to duties of trust and
confidence?
The answer to this question goes principally to the policy motivations
of the Commission. Who is the Commission going after and why-both in
terms of rulemaking and enforcement? Is the Commission seeking to
generally promote fair and efficient trading upon current, accurate, well
disbursed information; or, is it targeting submarkets where the boundaries
of conventional trading are being pushed-in state of the art hedging, in
PIPES3 (where public trades are made with knowledge of looming high risk
. Thomas M. Madden (BA Trinity College, MA, New York University, JD, Northwestern
University School of Law) is principal of The Madden Law Firm, P.C. in Providence, RI, which he
founded after an early career with Donovan Leisure Newton & Irvine and Jones Day Reavis & Pogue in
New York. He currently teaches as an Adjunct Professor of Business Ethics at Johnson & Wales
University and is an active member of the Rhode Island, New York and Massachusetts Bars.
1. United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997).
2. 17 CFR §§ 240, 243, 249; S.E.C. Release 33-7881, Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading,
effective October 23, 2000.
3. PIPES, "Public Investments in Private Equity", are investments made often by hedge fund
managers in companies about to go public via reverse mergers into languishing public "shells". See
Bruce Hiler, Tom Kuczajda & Anne Marie Helm, Enforcement PIPEline" Insider Trading,
UnregisteredSale, and the Hedging of PrivateInvestments with Public Equity, 39 SEC. REG. & LAW

952 (June 18, 2007).
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would-be initial public offerings), and where dealmaker relationships may
constitute a market bifurcated from individual investors and the lesser
informed?
I. MISAPPROPRIATION AND O'HAGAN, CIRCA

1997

In its nascent stages, what became a Supreme Court doctrine in 1997,
was the S.E.C.'s theory advanced in Matter of Cady, Roberts & Co.' and
expanded in 1980 in then Chief Justice Burger's dissent from the majority
in Chiarella v. United States.5 " 6 The "misappropriation theory," as
enunciated in Justice Ginsburg's majority opinion handed down in June of
1997 in United States v. O'Hagan,7 was hardly the birth of consensus on
SEC policy governing insider, quasi-insider and outsider trading. 8 It was,
however, the direct address by the nation's highest court of an issue of
longstanding contention among scholars, practitioners, the federal
judiciary, and vicariously, anyone else interested in federal securities law
and fair and efficient public securities markets.
A.

BEFORE O'HAGAN

Burger's 1980 conception of section 10(b)9 of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934"0 (the "Exchange Act") and Rule lOb-5 " promulgated
4. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
5. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
6. Note, however, that as Justice Ginsburg asserts, the form of the misappropriation theory
adopted in O 'Hagan is not the same as that advocated by Chief Justice Burger in his Chiarella dissent.
See O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 655 n.6. In O'Hagan, "the disclosure obligation runs to the source of the
information" Burger would have had it run "to those with whom the misappropriator trades." Chiarella,
445 U.S. at 240.
7. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 742.
8. See Ralph Ferrara, FERRARA ON INSIDER TRADING AND THE WALL, § 2.02 [6][a] for an
overview of the misappropnation theory in the context of § 10(b) and Rule I0b-5 fraud precedent.
9. It shall be unlawful "To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative or
deceptive device in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as
necessary of appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors."
10. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b).
11. Rule lOb-5 states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any
facility of any national securities exchange, (a) to employ any device, scheme, or
artifice to defraud, (b) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit
to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or (c) to
engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or
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thereunder by the Securities and Exchange Commission (the
"Commission") was broad and policy oriented.' 2 It was written in contrast
to Justice Powell's narrowly tailored majority decision in Chiarella finding
that a fiduciary duty must exist and be breached and that that breach must
touch the party to the transaction to whom the duty is owed; "liability
[under section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5] is premised upon a duty to disclose
arising from a relationship of trust and confidence between parties to a
transaction."' 3 Powell's majority refused to uphold a lower court ruling
holding Chiarella liable for trading based upon information about the
proposed takeover of a client of his printing firm employer which he had
gathered in the course of his employment. The ChiarellaCourt held that "a
duty to disclose does not arise from the mere possession of non-public
market information and noted that as a matter of policy, we should not
discourage the acquisition of market information." 4 Burger dissented. He
thought, on the other hand, that Chiarella's conviction by the lower court
should be upheld. In his dissent, Burger laid the groundwork for the
adoption of the misappropriation theory. He wrote:
I would read § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 to encompass and build on this

principle: to mean that a person who has misappropriated non-public
information has an absolute duty to disclose that information or to
refrain from trading."'

5

Moreover, he emphasized that "by their terms

these [ section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5] provisions reach any person
engaged in any fraudulent scheme.16

This expansive conception of the "disclose or abstain rule" would create a
basis of section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 liability that could easily encompass
the 1997 version of the misappropriation theory.
In his Chiarella dissent, Burger looked to Cady, Roberts & Co. 17and
the general policy of securities laws to assure fairness among investors.'"
In Cady, Roberts, a broker-dealer who was a director of an issuer in which
the broker-dealer traded, passed on information about the issuer to a
colleague who traded in the issuer's securities based upon that information
about an hour before the information became public. In Cady, Roberts, the
Commission reasoned that it cannot "accept respondents' contention that an
sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.1Ob-5.
Generally, there are five elements required to establish a claim under Rule 10b-5: (1)fraud (including
materiality, reliance, causation and damages) or deceit, (2) by a person, (3) in connection with, (4) the
purchase or sale, (5) of any security. See Hazen, THE LAW OF SECURITIEs REGULATION, Ch. 13 for an
overview of the elements of Rule lOb-5.
13. Chiarella v. United States, 455 U.S. 222, 230 (1980).
14 Id. at 235.
15. Id. at 240.
16 Id.
17. 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
18. Chiarella, at 241.

HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 4:1

Insider's responsibility is limited to existing stockholders and that he has
no special duties when sales of securities are made to non-stockholders."' 9
The Cady, Roberts court adopted a "parity of information" approach,
reasoning that those with nonpublic information should not profit at the
expense of those in the market without that information, again referring
only to purchasers or sellers.2 ° The Commission's language in Cady,
Roberts had the effect of extending protection to the buying public, but
only to those actually purchasing securities. Burger would extend this
fraud protection to the general buying public, including merely potential
buyers."
B.

O'HAGAN

Ginsburg's O'Hagan decision overturned the Eighth Circuit's reversal
of a trial court criminal conviction' of a lawyer working for a firm
representing a client contemplating a tender offer to take over a target
company. O'Hagan was a lawyer at Dorsey & Whitney who learned of a
client's takeover plan through work at his firm. He traded in securities of
his client's target company, not his client, based upon the information he
learned through working at his firm and, consequently, profited by several
million dollars. The S.E.C. brought suit against O'Hagan under section
10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 1Ob-5.
Ginsburg's majority opinion in O'Hagan was reasoned from the
Commission's approach taken in Cady, Roberts and the extension of that
approach by Burger in his Chiarella dissent. Early in her opinion,
Ginsburg set out the policy argument behind the O'Hagan decision:
"Because undisclosed trading on the basis of misappropriated, nonpublic
information both deceives the source of the information and harms
members of the investing public, the misappropriation theory is tuned to an
animating purpose of the Exchange Act: to ensure honest markets, thereby
promoting investor confidence." 2 This broad policy directive easily
envelops an extended reading of section 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5.
Ginsburg's use of the misappropriation theory in her majority opinion
19. In re Cady Robert & Co., 40 S.E.C 907, 913 (1961).
20. Id. at 914.
21. Burger's reasoning conjures commentary on the "fraud-on-the-market theory" which is
tangential to the instant discussion. For background on the fraud-on-the-market theory, see Nicholas L.
Georgakopoulos, Frauds, Markets, and Fraud-on-the-Market- the Tortured Transition of Justifiable
Reliance From Deceit to Securities Fraud, 49 U. MIAMI L. REV. 671 (1995), 29 SEC. L. REV. 511
(1997), Paul G. Mahoney, Precaution Costs and the Law of Fraud in Impersonal Markets, 78 VA. L.
REV 623 (1992); Daniel R. Fischel & David J. Ross, Should the Law Prohibit "Manipulation" in
Financial Markets?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 503 (1991); Daniel R. Fischel, Efficient Capital Markets, the
Crash, and the Fraud on the Market Theory, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 907 (1989). (emphasis added)
22. United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S 642 /at 99,240.
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in O 'Haganfocused on the theory's elements of fraud and deception which
the lower court found lacking. 23 She cites Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v.
Green to make the point that the misappropriation theory correctly applies
section 10(b), not as a general ban on breaching fiduciary duty25 but as a
more specific prohibitor of manipulation and deception.26 (Under the facts
of Santa Fe, after management's full disclosure of formerly nonpublic
information regarding the use of the Delaware statutory short form merger,
none of the manipulation or deception alleged by the minority shareholders
was found present). But the case from which Ginsburg derives the crux of
adopting the misappropriation theory is Carpenter v. United
her argument
27
States.
1.

Misappropriation Theory Precedent

28
Before delving into Carpenter,we should note that Cady, Roberts
and Chiarella are the two key cases in tracking the origin of the
misappropriation theory. We've discussed the two key cases in terms of
their relevance to the theory and to the development of section 10(b) and
Rule IOb-5 fraud liability generally in the preceding section.
In Carpenter, an investment advice columnist disclosed nonpublic
information about issuers which was prohibited to be disclosed by his
publisher/employer and went on to share in the profits gained by his tippees
who traded based on the nonpublic information. Carpenter offers a
discussion of fraud regarding a property right; that is, the
publisher/employer's property interest in the nonpublic information.
Winans, the tipping columnist in Carpenter, (and his tippees) were found
guilty by the lower court of mail and wire fraud29 and of violating section
10(b) of the Exchange Act. The Supreme Court upheld the section 10(b)
decision without discussion because the Court was evenly split on the
issue. The Court gave its reasons for upholding the mail and wire fraud
decision-finding that the fraud was committed against the
publisher/employer who held the property interest in the nonpublic
information. The lower court reasoning on the section 10(b) issue, which
the Supreme Court accepted by default, was that the same fraud on the

23. United States v. O'Hagan, 92 F.3d 612 (8th Cir. 1996).
24. Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
25. Id. at 473.
26 Id. at 475-77.
27. Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
28. See also, S.E.C. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S.
976 (1969) where the Second Circuit adopted the "parity of information" approach found in Cady
Roberts.
29. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 and conspiracy 18 U.S.C. § 371. ???
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publisher/employer was a violation of section 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5
because that fraud was "in connection with" a purchase or sale of securities
-- even though that purchase or sale did not involve the defrauded
publisher/employer.
In Carpenter,then, the court did not require that the fraud element in
the section 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5 violation be on the shareholders of the
company about which the nonpublic information was known. It was
enough that a fraud was broadly "in connection with" the purchase and sale
of securities.3 ° It is this broadened reading of Rule lOb-5, harkening back
to Burger's Chiarella dissent and the earlier Cady, Roberts decision, that
allowed the misappropriation theory to work for Ginsburg.
Ginsburg wholeheartedly adopted a broad reading, notwithstanding
her disclaimer that she had not adopted the sweeping rule proposed by
Burger in his Chiarella dissent." Indeed, in the first paragraph of her
opinion, Ginsburg frames the section 10(b) issue as follows: "Is a person
who trades in securities for personal profit, using confidential information
misappropriated in breach of a fiduciary duty to the source of the
information, guilty of violating § 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5?"32 The very way
she frames this issue precludes following the approach set out by Powell in
his majority opinion in Chiarella. Ginsburg framed the issue with a
particular (fraud on the source) version the misappropriation theory already
tacitly adopted.
The facts of O'Hagan make this issue framing determinative of the
case's outcome. As mentioned, O'Hagan was a lawyer for a firm
representing a company in matters preliminary to making a tender offer for
a target company. During that representation, he learned the nonpublic
information of the client's tender offer plans to acquire the target company.
He then traded in the client's target's securities based upon that nonpublic
information to his significant profit.
If the Court in O'Hagan followed the Chiarella majority, the issue
would be: is a person who uses nonpublic information to trade in securities
for personal profit guilty of violating section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 even
though he has no fiduciary duty to any party to the purchase or sale of the
securities in which he trades? Obviously, this framing of the issue would
not have lead to the Court's decision.
In a 1981 opinion, U.S. v. Newman,33 the Second Circuit applied the
misappropriation theory, making specific references to both Stevens' and
30. See Barbara Bader Aldave, The Misappropriation Theory: Carpenter and Its Aftermath, 49
OHIO ST. L.J. 373 (1988); see also, Barbara Bader Aldave, Misappropriation:A general Theory of
Liabilityfor Tradingon Nonpublic Information, 13 HOFSTRA L. REV. 101 (1984).
31. See supra note 3
32. United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 /at 97,241 (emphasis added).
33. United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981).
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Burger's dissents in Chiarella. The Newman court relied mainly on
Second Circuit precedent34 in asserting that "long before appellee
undertook to participate in the fraudulent scheme alleged in the indictment,
this court, and other courts of appeals as well, had held that a plaintiff need
not be a defrauded purchaser or seller in order to sue for injunctive relief
under Rule lOb-5."35 The court simply accepted the facts (that insider
investment bank employees repeatedly tipped off Newman about upcoming
takeovers of the investment banks' clients and Newman regularly directed
conspirators to execute foreign trades based upon that nonpublic
information over a period of several years) as establishing fraud and deceit
-relying, inter alia, on Burger's Chiarelladissent. The crux of the court's
reasoning lies in its statement that "since appellee's sole purpose in
participating in the misappropriation of confidential takeover information
was to purchase shares of the target companies, we find little merit in his
disavowal of a connection between the fraud and the purchase. 36 Again,
under the duty to the source version of the misappropriation theory, the
fraud tied to the fiduciary duty need not involve the shareholders of the
company in whose securities the trades are made.
In S.E.C. v. Materia,37 the Second Circuit repeated its approach taken
in Newman. The facts in Materia were most similar to those in Chiarella.
An employee of a financial printer misappropriated nonpublic information
from his employer about pending tender offers and used that information to
trade in the securities of the tender offer targets to his substantial profit.
The Materia court found obvious fraud and deceit and as in Newman held:
"one who misappropriates nonpublic information in a breach of a fiduciary
duty and trades on that information to his own advantage violates Section
10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5." 3 The court ultimately looked to the policy behind
the Exchange Act, the insurance of fair and efficient public securities
39
markets, calling that policy the "lodestar" on which its decision relies. ' 40
The alternative to the misappropriation theory is the "classical
theory," and the two are not necessarily mutually exclusive.
The
"classical" standard of a violation of Rule 1Ob-5 is clearly set out as dicta

34. Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1969); Mutual Shares Corp.
v. Genesco Inc., 384 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1976).
35. Newman, at 17.
36 Id. at 18.
37. S.E.C. v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1984).
38. Id. at 203.
39. Id.
40. For further precedent within the Second Circuit, see also United States v. Willis, 737 F. Supp.
269 (S.D.N Y 1990) (breach of a relationship of a psychiatrist with the wife of a businessman was
enough to find Rule 1Ob-5 liability when the psychiatrist traded in securities of a corporation involving
the businessman/husband based on the nonpublic information revealed to him by the patient/wife,
which information she had learned from her husband), SEC v. Musella, 578 F. Supp. 425 (S.D.N.Y.
1984) (where tippees of an administrative law firm employee inherited duty not to trade from tipper).
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41
in S.E.C. v. Clark:

A person violates Rule lOb-5 by buying or selling securities on the
basis of material nonpublic information if (1) he owes a fiduciary or
similar duty to the other party to the transaction; (2) he is an insider of
the corporation in whose shares he trades, and thus owes a fiduciary
duty to the corporation's shareholders; or (3) he is a tippee who
received his information from an insider of the corporation and knows,
or should know, that the insider breached a fiduciary duty in disclosing
the information to him.42
The classical theory, as so stated, is actually an agglomeration of precedent
finding insiders and tippees, or quasi-insiders, guilty of violating Rule IOb5. It is not a theoretical construct, but the result of case law applying Rule
lOb-5 to a series of discrete facts. While the classical theory applies
insiders and tippees, or quasi-insiders, the misappropriation theory may
apply further to "outsiders." The misappropriation theory is a theoretical
tool constructed from the Commission's/government's arguments asserting
Rule 1Ob-5 coverage over "outsiders," not just insiders and quasi-insiders.
The classical definition could not fit the facts of Clark where Clark
was found to be neither an insider nor a tippee and consequently had no
relevant duty to disclose or abstain from trading in certain securities on the
basis of nonpublic information.43 Clark was the principal of a recently
acquired company and learned from a colleague on the parent company's
acquisition team that the acquirer was going to make another acquisition.
Subsequently, Clark traded in the stock of the parent's potential target to
his significant profit.
The Clarkcourt went on to adopt the misappropriation theory, stating,
Unlike the classical theory, the misappropriation theory extends to
trading by outsiders. Generally speaking, the theory provides that Rule
lOb-5 is violated when a person (1) misappropriates material nonpublic
information (2) by breaching a duty arising out of a relationship of trust
and confidence and (3) uses that information in a securities transaction,
(4) regardless of whether he owed any duties to the shareholders of the
traded stock.44
Under the broader misappropriation theory, the court was able to find that
Clark, as an outsider, violated of Rule 1Ob-5. He had no fiduciary duty to
the company or shareholders of the takeover target, was not a tippee who
knew that his tipper had such a duty, but still was found to have violated
Rule 1Ob-5.

41.
42.
43.
44.

S.E.C. v. Clark; 915 F.2d 439 (9th Cir. 1990).
Id at 443.
Id.
Id.
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The Clark court went on to justify its broader reading by looking to
the adoption of the rule and to the legislative history surrounding the
securities law and noted that Rule 1Ob-5 was intended to be a "catchall" for
fraud in securities trading.4 5 Yet, even though the court consciously
adopted a broader reading of Rule 1Ob-5 than any Supreme Court precedent
allowed, it was a qualified reading. The Clark court noted, "[t]he
misappropriation theory, as we have adopted it today, applies only where
the misappropriationoccurs by means of a violation offiduciary or some
similar duty., 46 That duty did not have to be to the shareholders of the
company in whose shares the violating trades were conducted. Moreover,
that duty, which was limited factually in Clark as one arising from
employment, it was noted by the court, need not be express.
In S.E.C. v. Cherif 47 the Seventh Circuit adopted the misappropriation
theory following the Ninth Circuit's "common sense notion of fraud"
applied in Clark.48 Cherif had terminated his employment at a bank, but
retained access to his former employer's place of business. He used that
access to obtain nonpublic information from his former employer and
conducted securities trades based upon it. The Seventh Circuit reasoned
that the breach of a fiduciary duty arising from employment, even if owed
to a past employer, was enough to apply Rule IOb-5. The Cherif court
concerned itself with the breach of a fiduciary duty owed to the source of
the nonpublic information; "[t]he misappropriation theory focuses not on
the insider's fiduciary duty to the issuing company or its shareholders but
on whether the insider breached a fiduciary duty to any lawful possessor of
material nonpublic information."4 9 Thus, the Cherif court's application
gave us a slightly broader version of the misappropriation theory than did
the Clark court.
Both Clark and Cherif give us the approach necessary to use the
misappropriation theory. The court must simply look to the breach of a
fiduciary duty owed to the source of the information in order to find Rule
lOb-5 liability. This, again, is the approach taken in Ginsburg's initial
framing of the issue at the outset of her O 'Hagan opinion and is the law as
a result of the Supreme Court's adoption of her majority opinion. After
O'Hagan, the fraud at issue in a Rule 1Ob-5 violation no longer had to be
tied to the fiduciary duty owed to shareholders, whether actual or potential
buyers, in a traded company's securities.
The Second Circuit applied the misappropriation theory in U.S. v.

45
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id. at 448
Id. at 453. (emphasis added)
S.E.C v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1991).
Id. at 410.
Id. at 409.
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5 °
Chestman.
In Chestman, the theory was expanded beyond the
employment relationship as the source of the fiduciary duty affected by the
fraud covered under Rule 1Ob-5, even though such a duty was eventually
not found present in the facts of the case. Chestman was a broker who
traded in an issuer's stock after his client phoned him with nonpublic
information that the issuer was shortly to be acquired for more than its
current trading price.

Chestman's tipper was a client who learned of the information through
marriage to a woman whose family owned a significant amount of equity
of the company involved in the planned acquisition and included members
of the board of directors. The broker, Chestman, used the information to
trade for his client's (the husband's) account and was originally convicted
of violating Rule 1Ob-5 as an aider and abettor to the husband. The
Chestman court spent several pages discussing the nature of fiduciary duty
and focused on the "relationship of trust or confidence" at the heart of the
duty. 5t The essential element in the duty is reliance.5 2 After extensive
discussion of fiduciary duty and consideration of the possible implied duty
of the husband to the family owned corporation not to disclose the
nonpublic information, the court found that such a duty was not present
because there was no prior aspect of the relationship that would establish
such an implied duty. Thus, the aiding and abetting link to Chestman was
meaningless and the Rule 1Ob-5 claims against Chestman were overturned.
Prior to O'Hagan, the most recent decision on the misappropriation
theory was an emphatic rejection of the theory handed down by the Fourth
Circuit in U.S. v. Bryan.53 The misappropriation theory as adopted by the
Second, Seventh and Ninth Circuits, was well defined by the Bryan court
as consisting of four elements: (1) misappropriation of material nonpublic
information (2) by breaching a duty arising out of a relationship of trust and
confidence and (3) using that information in a securities transaction, (4)
regardless of whether [one owes] any duties to the shareholders of the
traded stock.54

50. United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551 (2d Or. 1991).
51. Id at 568. (emphasis added)
52. Id.
53. United States v. Bryan. 58 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1995).
54. Id. at 944. See Timothy J. Horman, In Defense of U.S. v. Bryan. Why the Misappropriation
Theory is Indefensible, 64 FORDHAM L. REv. 2455 (1996); see also, Beeson, Rounding the Peg to Fit
the Hole: A Proposed Regulatory Reform of the MisappropriationTheory, 144 U. PA. L. REv 1077
(1996); Block & Barton, Securities Litigation: Insider Trading - The Need for Legislation, 10 SEC.
REG. L.J. 350 (1983); Timothy Sullivan, We're Still Against Fraud, Aren't We? United States v.
O'Hagan Trimming the Oak in the Wrong Season, 71 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 192 (1997); Jonathan E.A.
ten Oever, Insider Trading and the Dual Role of Information: United States v. O'Hagan, 92 F.3d 612
(8th Cir. 1996), 106 YALE L.J. 1325 (1997); Frank H. Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents,
Evidentiary Privileges, and the Production of Information, 1981 Sup. CT. REV. 309; Shawn J.
Lindquist, U.S. v. O'Hagan: The Eighth Circuit Throws the Second Strike to the Misappropriation
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The Bryan court repudiated the misappropriation theory in a fact
pattern where the director of the West Virginia state lottery traded in the
securities of companies with whom the state lottery was doing business.
During the course of his employment as director, Bryan was privy to
nonpublic information about increased business the lottery would give
these companies. The Bryan court, in finding no section 10(b) liability,
noted that Bryan had no fiduciary duty to the companies in which he
traded, nor to their shareholders.
The Bryan court's view of the misappropriation theory in relation to
the history of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 and precedent thereon is most
clear here:
Section 10(b) ... prohibits only the use of deception, in the form of
material misrepresentations or omissions, to induce action or inaction
by purchasers or sellers of securities, or that affects others with a vested
interest in a securities transaction. In contravention of this established
principle, the misappropriation theory authorizes criminal conviction
for simple breaches of fiduciary duty and similar relationships of trust
and confidence, whether or not the breaches entail deception within the
meaning of Section 10(b) and whether or not the parties wronged by
the breaches were purchasers or sellers of securities, or otherwise
connected with or interested in the purchase or sale of securities.
Finding no authority for such an expansion of securities fraud
liability-indeed, finding the theory irreconcilable with applicable
Supreme Court precedent-we reject application of the theory in this
circuit.55
As the Bryan court clearly sets out, the fraud on the source version of
the misappropriation theory radically alters the prior standard for
conviction under section 10(b).
2.

More on the "Classical Theory"

The O'Hagan Court's adoption of the government's term "Classical
Theory" more accurately denotes a loose composite of various precedent
on Rule 10b-5 liability including liability found for categories of insiders,
tippers and tippees or quasi-insiders.
In Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores56 the Supreme Court, in
Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion, gave us the rule that a private action

Theory of Rule lOb-5 Liability, 1997 B.Y.U.L. REV. 197 (1997).
55. Bryan, 58 F.3d at 944.
56. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U S. 723 (1975).
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under Rule 1Ob-5 can apply only to actual purchasers or sellers of
securities. In Blue Chip, an offeree alleged that an issuing company issued
a false and misleading prospectus to him and other shareholders for an
offering made subsequent to the reorganization." The Court looked to the
Second Circuit's Birnbaum58 Rule which provides that private actions
under Rule 1Ob-5 are limited to purchasers and sellers of securities. 9 In a
policy discussion, the Court considered the strike suit potential that could
arise if private rights of action were expanded. The Court further
considered the analogous common law of the tort of deceit before deciding
that the weight of the policy issues favored upholding the Birnbaum Rule.60
The Court thus held that the offeree or offerees as a class were not entitled
to sue for a violation of Rule lOb-5. 6' This "Classical" holding clearly
could not be relied upon to support the adoption of the misappropriation
theory.
In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder6 2 the Supreme Court addressed Rule
1Ob-5 via an issue of aiding and abetting liability. In Ernst & Ernst, an
accounting firm failed to detect fraudulent escrow accounts at a securities
firm which could have been uncovered by deeper inquiry into an unusual
"mail rule" regarding the accounts.63 In Powell's majority decision, the
Court held that negligent conduct was not enough but that scienter must be
present in the alleged aider or abettor's actions in order to find civil liability
attached to Rule IOb-5 fraud. Ultimately, the Court found that because the
accountants were merely negligent in their duties, they were not liable for
the fraudulent accounts under Rule 1Ob-5. A similar holding was issued in
CentralBank. 4
In Dirks v. S.E.C.65 the Supreme Court held that a tippee officer of a
broker-dealer who received information from an insider that an insurance
company's stock would soon plummet in value, and then traded in the
insurance company's stock based upon that information, was not liable of a
Rule lOb-5 violation. The Court reasoned that the duty of a tippee is
derivative and thus a breach or fraud occurs by the tippee only where a
prior breach of a fiduciary by the insider/tipper to his employer's
shareholders occurs. The Court looked to Chiarella to find the rule that
there can be no duty to disclose where the person who has traded on inside
information "was not [the corporation's] agent, ....
was not a fiduciary, [or]
57. Id. at 726.
58. Bimbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956
(1952).
59. Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 731-32.

60.
61.
62
63.
64.
65.

Id. at 740-9.
Id. at 755.
425 U.S. 185 (1976).
Id. at 190.
Id. at 214.
Dirks v. S.E.C., 463 U.S 646 (1983).
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was not a person in whom the sellers [of the securities] had placed their
trust and confidence. 66 The Court added that "[i]mposing a duty to
disclose or abstain solely because a person knowingly receives material
nonpublic information from an insider and trades on it could have an
inhibiting influence on the role of market analysts, which the S.E.C. itself
recognizes is necessary to the preservation of a healthy market."67 No
fiduciary relationship was found which would give rise to the duty.
Repeatedly, the Court, in Powell's majority decision, emphasized that the
tippee's, or as used herein, the "quasi-insider's" duty is not nonexistent, but
is derivative of the duty held by the tipper.68 As there was no breach of
fiduciary duty by the tipper, the tippee inherited no derivative breach.
However, the Dirks decision does not renounce any tippee duty giving rise
to Rule 1Ob-5 liability. To the contrary, it forcefully recognizes the
categories of tipper and tippee liability.
In Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver,
N.A. 69 the Supreme Court again considered aiding and abetting status under
section 10(b). 7 ° An appraiser of land which was collateral for a bond issue
was accused of fraudulently inflating land values and consequently
violating section 10(b). The bond issues' indenture trustee, the bank that
hired the appraiser and delayed review of the potentially inaccurate
appraisal, was accused of aiding and abetting the appraisal fraud, also
violating section 10(b). After looking to Ernst & Ernst, Santa Fe, and
Chiarella, Justice Kennedy, in a majority opinion for the Court, wrote,
"[o]ur consideration of statutory duties, especially in cases interpreting
section 10(b), establishes that the statutory text controls the definition of
conduct covered by section 10(b)."' That language does not include aiding
and abetting.72 The Court added that aiding and abetting is not even
"indirect liability" which is statutorily covered under section 10(b).73
With regard to general section 10(b) liability, the Central Bank Court
pronounced that
[a]ny person or entity, including a lawyer, a accountant, or bank, who
employs a manipulative device or makes a material misstatement (or
omission) on which a purchaser or seller of securities relies may be
liable as a primary violator under lOb-5, assuming all of the
requirements for primary liability under Rule 1Ob-5 are met.74
66.
67
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id. at 654.
Id. at 658.
Id. at 659.
Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
CentralBank, at 175.
Id.
Id. at 176.
Id. at 191.
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Note that the Central Bank Court's "classical" approach does not
move liability beyond the breach of a fiduciary duty to purchasers or sellers
involved in the securities transaction as the misappropriation theory would
allow.
As the Blue Chip, Ernst & Ernst, and Central Bank decisions taken
together indicate, "Classical Theory" precedent is somewhat lacking in
uniformity.
Generally, it requires, in great distinction to the
misappropriation theory, the breach of a fiduciary duty to shareholders
involved in the securities transaction. The duty can be simply that of an
insider employee or can be one inherited from an insider by a tippee or
quasi-insider. As the dicta from Central Bank points out, inherited duties
can give rise to liability among lawyers, accountants and bankers, among
others. However, no "outsider" could be found liable of violating section
10(b) or Rule 1Ob-5 under the "classical" precedent.
3. The Classical - Misappropriation Theory Dichotomy and Outsider
Trading Liability
Ginsburg's O'Hagan opinion appears to rely heavily on the case's
Brief for the United States. She embraces the government's presentation of
a dichotomy between "classical" and "misappropriation" approaches to
determining section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 liability and argues for the
misappropriation theory. This unqualified endorsement of the fraud on the
source version of the misappropriation theory leaves her with the adoption
of outsider trading liability. After O'Hagan, there is no longer simply
insider trading or even quasi-insider (tippee) trading liability: there is
outsider trading liability.
A. Brief for the United States
Ginsburg cites the brief for the United States to emphasize the
distinguishing element in the two theories: in the classical theory, the
fiduciary duty at issue is owed to the shareholders of the corporation about
which material nonpublic information which, based upon circuit court
precedent, can include property based relationships at the center of duties
owed to employers, former employers, and possibly family members or
75
others. , 76
She follows the government's presentation of the deception involved

75. United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991).
76. Brief for United States, O'Hagan No. 96-842, LEXIS 14.
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in O'Hagan, accepting it at face value. That a lawyer would trade on
nonpublic information is to be construed almost facially as deceiving to the
source of the information. As Ginsburg quotes from the Brief for the
United States, "[T]he misappropriation theory is thus designed to 'protec[t]
the integrity of the securities markets against abuses by "outsiders" to a
corporation who have access to confidential information that will affect
the[e] corporation's security price when revealed, but owe no fiduciary
duty to that corporation's shareholders.""' Under the adopted theory, the
deception lies in the false loyalty to the source of the information which is
betrayed upon the sharing of that information, presumably with one who
initiates a securities trade based upon that information.
The "in connection with" element is satisfied under the theory when,
without disclosure to the source of his information, the misappropriator
trades. In great contrast to the classical approach, it does not matter
whether the other party or parties to the trade are in any way deceived or
touched by the fraud.
"The purchase and sale of any security" is read with an emphasis on
the "any." This last element is expanded in the government's brief with the
rationale that "[s]ection 10(b) authorizes the SEC to prohibit deceptive
devices as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors."78 The government goes on to argue that the SEC
is authorized to and (implicitly) should "prohibit deceptive acts that, it
concludes, would have a deleterious effect on the integrity of the securities
markets, even if the deception is not practiced directly on the person on the
other side of the securities trade. 79
B. Statutory and Regulatory Redress
The Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988
(ITSFEA)8 ° was an attempt to address the concerns discussed here through
a modification of the Exchange Act. The ITSFEA's section 20A (15
U.S.C. 78t-1), added in 1998, created a cause of action against anyone
violating the Exchange Act "by purchasing or selling a security while in
possession of material, nonpublic information" for the benefit of anyone
who "contemporaneously with the purchase or sale of securities that is the
subject of such violation, has purchased or sold securities of the same
class."
It thus expanded civil liability over "controlling persons."
However, it was two years later that the Commission adopted Rules 10b5-1
77.
78.
79.
80.

United Staes v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 /at 97,243.
O'Hagan, Brief for U.S, at 18.
O'Hagan, Brief for U.S., at 18.
Pub. L. No. 100-704, § 2(1), 102 Stat. 4677.
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and 10b5-2; and it is under the latter rules that case law in the O'Hagan
line has continued to address securities fraud with the fraud on the source
version of the misappropriation theory.
If we were to decide the issue presented in O'Hagan8" by looking to
precedent confined to the classical theory cases discussed supra, there
would be no doubt that the O'Hagan Court had overstepped its bounds and
created a new doctrine of law from whole cloth. Moreover, if we were to
decide the same issue presented in O'Hagan by considering the classical
theory cases together with the pre-O'Haganmisappropriation theory cases,
it is not entirely clear that we should not come away with that same
conclusion. Indeed, we would be hard pressed to overlook the admonition
of the Fourth Circuit in Bryan. 2 It must be emphasized, however, that this
is not to say that the behavior of O'Hagan, and similar behavior seen in
earlier precedent, is not intuitively culpable or in contravention of the spirit
of the Exchange Act. It was this apparently growing intuition surrounding
the spirit of the Exchange Act that cried out for a more explicit address of
the very problem the O'Hagan Court resolved: whose duties are at issue?
What relationships matter?
II.

RULE 10b5-2, CIRCA 2007

The more recent action by the Commission to promulgate new Rules
10b5-1 and 10b5-2 3 was a direct reaction to the O'Hagan decision and its
81. See supra at 8.
82. See supra at14-15.
83. SEC Release 33-7881.
Rule 10b5-1. Trading "On the Basis Of' Material Nonpublic Information in Insider
Trading Cases.
Preliminary Note to Rule 10b5-1: This provision defines when a purchase or sale
constitutes trading "on the basis of' material nonpublic information in insider trading cases
brought under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule IOb-5 thereunder. The law of
insider trading is otherwise defined by judicial opinions construing Rule 10b-5, and Rule
lOb5-1 does not modify the scope of insider trading law in any other respect.
(a) General. The "manipulative and deceptive devices" prohibited by Section 10(b) of the
Exchange Act and Rule IOb-5 thereunder include, among other things, the purchase or sale
of a security of any issuer, on the basis of material nonpublic information about that
security or issuer, in breach of a duty of trust or confidence that is owed directly,
indirectly, or derivatively, to the issuer of that security or the shareholders of that issuer, or
to any other person who is the source of the material nonpublic information.
(b) Definition of "On the Basis Of." Subject to the affirmative defenses in paragraph (c)
of this Rule 10b5-1, a purchase or sale of a security of an issuer is "on the basis of'
material nonpublic information about that security or issuer if the person making the
purchase or sale was aware of the material nonpublic information when the person made
the purchase or sale.
(c) Affimative Defenses.
(1)(i) Subject to paragraph (c)(l)(ii) of this Rule lOb5-1, a person's purchase or sale is not
"on the basis of' material nonpublic information if the person making the purchase or sale
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demonstrates that:
(A) Before becoming aware of the information, the person had:
(I) Entered into a binding contract to purchase or sell the security,
(2) Instructed another person to purchase or sell the secunty for the instructing person's
account, or
(3) Adopted a written plan for trading secunties;
(B) The contract, instruction, or plan described in paragraph (c)(l)(i)(A):
(1)Specified the amount of secunties to be purchased or sold and the pnce at which and
the date on which the securities were to be purchased or sold;
(2) Included a wntten formula or algorithm, or computer program, for determining the
amount of securities to be purchased or sold and the price at which and the date on which
the securities were to be purchased or sold; or
(3) Did not permit the person to exercise any subsequent influence over how, when, or
whether to effect purchases or sales; provided, in addition, that any other person who,
pursuant to the contract, instruction, or plan, did exercise such influence must not have
been aware of the material nonpublic information when doing so; and
(C) The purchase or sale that occurred was pursuant to the contract, instruction, or plan.
A Purchase or sale is not "pursuant to a contract, instruction, or plan" if, among other
things, the person who entered into the contract, instruction, or plan to purchase or sell
securities (whether by changing the amount, price, or timing of the purchase or sale), or
entered into or altered a corresponding or hedging transaction or position with respect to
those securities.
(ii) Paragraph (c)(l)(i) of this Rule 10b5-1 is applicable only when the contract,
instruction, or plan to purchase or sell securities was given or entered into in good faith
and not as part of a plan or scheme to evade the prohibitions of this Rule 10b5-1.
(iii) This subparagraph defines certain terms as used in paragraph (c).
(A) Amount. "Amount" means either a specified number of shares of other securities or a
specified dollar value of securities.
(B) Price. "Price" means the market price on a particular date or a limit price, or a
particular dollar price.
(C) Date. "Date" means, in the case of a market order, the specific day of the year on
which the order is to be executed (or as soon thereafter as is practicable under ordinary
principles of best execution). "Date" means, in the case of a limit order, a day of the year
on which the limit order is in force
(2) A person other than a natural person also may demonstrate that a purchase or sale of
securities is not "on the basis of' material nonpublic information if the person
demonstrates that.
(i) The individual making the investment decision on behalf of the person to purchase or
sell the secunties was not aware of the information; and
(ii)
The person had implemented reasonable policies and procedures, taking into
consideration the nature of the person's business, to ensure that individuals making
investment decisions would not violate the laws prohibiting trading on the basis of matenal
nonpublic information. These policies and procedures may include those that restrict any
purchase, sale, and causing any purchase or sale of any security as to which the person has
material nonpublic information, or those that prevent such individuals from becoming
aware of such information.
Rule 10b5-2. Duties of Trust or confidence in Misappropnation Insider Trading Cases.
Preliminary Note to Rule 10b5-2: This Rule 1Ob5-2 provides a nonexclusive definition of
circumstances in which a person has a duty of trust or confidence for purposes of the
"misappropriation" theory of insider trading under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and
Rule 1Ob-5. The law of insider trading is otherwise defined by judicial opinions
construing Rule 1Ob-5, and Rule 10b5-2 does not modify the scope of insider trading law
in any other respect.
(a) Scope of Rule. This Rule 10b5-2 shall apply to any violation of Section 10(b) of the
Exchange Act and Rule IOb-5 thereunder that is based on the purchase or sale of securities
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progeny and an attempt to better define the circumstances where the
misappropriation theory applies. Many critics have seen these new rules as
a blatant overstepping of bounds by the Commission.84 Others have opined
that the new rules did not go far enough.85
Rule 10b5-1 was constructed with regard to trading in securities to
define "on the basis of' material nonpublic information. The definition
hinges on whether the person making the purchase or sale was "aware" of
the material nonpublic information at the time of the trade. Certain
affirmative defenses are named in the rule. These defenses (subject to
certain details) center on whether the trading was at the direction of a
preexisting plan or contract.
Rule 10b5-2 seeks to define what are or where exist "duties of trust or
Such duties arise where a person "agrees to maintain
confidence."
information in confidence," where there is a history or pattern of the
sharing of such confidences between the parties or when a person receives
the information from a spouse, parent, sibling or child, unless the absence
of a trusting relationship is shown.
on the basis of, or the communication of, material nonpublic information misappropriated
in breach of a duty of trust or confidence.
(b) Enumerated "Duties of Trust or Confidence." For purposes of this Rule 10b5-2, a
"duty of trust or confidence" exists in the following circumstances, among others:
(1) Whenever a person agrees to maintain tnformation in confidence;
(2) Whenever the person communicating the material nonpublic information and the
person to whom it is communicated have a history, patter, or practice of sharing
confidences, such that the recipient of the information knows or reasonably should know
that the person communicating the material nonpublic information expects that the
recipient will maintain its confidentiality; or
(3) Whenever a person receives or obtains matenal nonpublic information from his or her
spouse, parent, child, or sibling; provided, however, that the person receiving or obtaining
the information may demonstrate that no duty of trust or confidence existed with respect to
the information, by establishing that he or she neither knew nor reasonably should have
known that the person who was the source of the information expected that the person
would keep the information confidential, because of the parties' history, pattern, or
practice of shanng and maintaining confidences, and because there was no agreement or
understanding to maintain the confidentiality of the information.
84. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Insider Trading Regulation The Path Dependent Choice Between
Property Rights and Securities Fraud,52 SMU L. REV. 1589 (1999); Donna M. Nagy, Refraining the
Misappropriation Theory of Insider Trading Liability: A Post-O'HaganSuggestion, 59 OHIO ST. L.J.
1223 (1998); Saikrishna Prakash, Our Dysfunctional Insider Trading Regime, 99 COLUMBIA L. REV.
1491 (1999); Kimberly D. Krawiec, Fairness,Efficiency, and Insider Trading: Deconstructingthe Coin
of the Realm in the Information Age, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 443 (2001); Randall W. Quinn, The
Misappropriation Theory of Insider Trading in the Supreme Court: A (Briej) Response to the (Many
Criticsof United States v. O'Hagan, 8 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 865 (2003).
85. Quinn, supra note 84; Ian Ayres & Stephen Choi, InternalizingOutsider Trading, 10 MICH. L.
REV. 313 (2002) (suggesting trading delays as a means of issuer self regulation of trading); Note David T. Cohen, Old Rule, New Theory. Revising the PersonalBenefit Requirementfor Tipper/Tippee
Liability Under the MisappropriationTheory of Insider Trading, 47 B.C.L. REV. 547 (2006); Note M. Breen Haire, The Uneasy DoctrinalCompromise of the Misappropriationtheory of Insider Trading,
73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1251 (1998).
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These rules were intended to work together with Rule lOb-5's basic
prohibition on (i) employing a device, scheme or artifice to defraud, (2) to
make an untrue statement of a material fact or omission ... (3) to carryout
fraud or deceit on a person. In essence, they were an attempt to include
outsiders, or at least peripheral quasi-insiders, within the scope of 1Ob-5,
which, prior to O'Hagan's adoption of the misappropriation theory,
ultimate case law had never done. This codification was certainly intended
to give the Commission authority well beyond the "Classical Theory"
precedent and in direct contradiction to the limits that Bryan would have
imposed.
Yet, few cases since the adoption of Rules 10b5-1 and 10b5-2 have
indicated an explicit following among the federal courts of the would-be
codification of O'Hagan. Cases under 1Ob-5 are necessarily fact based.
While some cases turn on facts directly under 10b5-1 86-- determining
whether a person was "aware of' the nonpublic information or traded "on
the basis" of the nonpublic information, my interest is in the relationships
contemplated by Rule 10b5-2 and whether such relationships give rise to
duties of trust or confidence.
Since adoption of the new rules, courts have found duties of trust and
confidence in relationships between employer and employee87 and between
former employer and former employee.8 8 This is really nothing new. Such
relationships were found to be locuses of fraud well before O'Hagan. In
Falcone, decided after O'Hagan and the new rules, but relying on
O'Hagan and apparently not considering the rules, the Second Circuit
found that a duty of trust and confidence existed between a printer and its
news distributor/wholesaler.89
Courts have also recently looked at relationships among members of
an executive business club 9° and between CEOs of an intended target and
its planned acquiror and have failed to find duties of trust and confidence.
In a current case particularly eschewing of the new rules, the Talbot court,
like the Kim court before it, looked back to Chestman as the kingpin in the
relationship analysis and relied upon language from Chestman that,
"reliance and de facto control and dominance such that confidence is
reposed on one side and there is resulting superiority and influence on
another" 9" defined the test of trust or confidence. Chestman was, of
course, decided long before both O'Hagan and the promulgation of Rules
10b5-1 and 2. (However, that decision readily appears to have informed the
86. A rule
and Adler.
87. S.E.C.
88. S.E.C.
89. United
90. United
91. S.E.C

wntten, perhaps, to address the problem of getting around scienter presented in Smith
v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1991).
v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1984).
States v. Falcone, 257 F.3d 226 (2d Cir. 2001)
States v. Joon Kim, 184 F Supp. 2d 1006 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
v. Talbot, 430 F. Supp. 2d 1029 (C.D. Cal. 2006).
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language and substance of Rule 10b5-2.)
Each of the cases referred to here demonstrates the importance of facts
characterizing relationships between parties giving or receiving material
nonpublic information and the courts' understanding of those relationships
in light of the law. They tell us that even a contractual agreement treating
information as confidential need not constitute adequate evidence of a
relationship giving rise to duties of trust or confidence and that the
existence of Rulel0b5-2 on top of relationship examining case law can be
treated as utterly superfluous.
III. So WHAT HAS 10b5-2 DONE?
That 10b5-2, or O'Hagan, for that matter, has truly settled any kind of
bright line standard is most doubtful. Courts appear to favor their own
handpicked precedent, and if they must give due attention to O'Hagan,
show, at the same time, a lack of deference to the new (now seven-yearold) rules. Rule 10b5-2 has been blatantly overlooked.
O'Hagan appears to be here to stay. Consequently, some version of
the misappropriation theory is here to stay. However, the version codified
with Rules 10b5-1 and 10b5-2 is not certain to prevail for the long run. At
best, these rules have contributed to the categorization of relationships
subject to securities fraud litigation that had begun long before O'Hagan.
While the regulations define characteristics of those relationships and
actually name several, they do not provide an exhaustive list, nor do they
offer true certainty. Each case under O'Hagan and the new rules will
continue to be fact determinative as the history of a family relationship or
the actual reliance in a business relationship must be analyzed beyond its
prima facie description.
So the Talbot court was not radical in its controlling look back to
Chestman, as the Kim court and Falcone court before it. It was, ironically,
performing the same sort of analysis called for under Rule 10b5-2, even if
not under its rubric. Both the Talbot analysis disregarding the new rule and
an analysis under 10b5-2 require a close consideration of the dispositive
relationship really as a result of O'Hagan or at least more as a result of
O'Hagan, as it is only since O'Hagan that the Supreme Court has made it
perfectly clear that duties subject to lOb-5 exist between or among
outsiders - those with no direct connection to the issuer of the stock traded
on material information. It is O'Hagan'sexplicit adoption of fraud on the
source misappropriation that has forever broadened the scope of
relationships to be examined, but the manner in which those relationships
are to be scrutinized is more a furtherance of preexisting case law. Under
Kim and Talbot, it appears that Rule 10b5-2 may be entirely superfluous.
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Enough case law may exist defining a relationship of trust or confidence
without it. There is no indication, however, that 10b5-2 is contradictory of
prior securities fraud decisions.
As to our overarching concern with the Commission's policy
motivations, it appears that the Commission has apparently not chosen to
direct, or has not been able to direct, litigation toward the boundary
pushing edge of the market either since O'Hagan or since the new rules.92
O'Hagan and the cases under the new rules focus on professional, family
or employment relationships. These relationships are old school.
We have no indication that the investors most capable of effecting
market volatility are being looked after by the Commission as a result of
o 'Hagan or the new rules in any way more seriously than before O 'Hagan
or the new rules. Indeed, the express exemption of planned trading under
Rule 10b5-1 would appear to create a kind of safe harbor for hedging
programs. Moreover, Rule 10b5-2's lack of any certain enumerated written
contractual relationship seems to overlook those either expressly
representing, or at least fully informed of, deals in the making as a definite
source of duties of trust or confidence.
Thus, rather than creating at least an impression of greater scrutiny at
the edge of an arguably information-based bifurcated market where
volatility is heightened, the Commission's rulemaking and subsequent
litigation indicates concern with the same traditional relationships
addressed in securities litigation for decades.
In sum, though several recent decisions have addressed the
relationship issue under O'Hagan, including those which Rule 10b5-2 was
drafted to control, the post-O'Hagan landscape on relationships giving rise
to duties of trust or confidence is, as yet, unchanged. We can only
conclude that the Commission is not actively targeting any particular
market segment or practice, but is seeking to promote fair and efficient
markets generally.

92. Of course, we are looking at case law, not all attempted or settled enforcement actions. For
some discussion of recent related enforcement actions see Hiler, Kuczajda, & Helm, supra note 3.
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